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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Spartan Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
59 → 59 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
461972227
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T06:39:35.981Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T06:39:58.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T06:39:58.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
ESFmF6ZB85hxTqp8hqVRKaPb2ZchUj5qFcRh9R4cvpkx
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1871 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b02fb6c5463ac9fd791b5e69b382f686","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:39:35.644Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4667,"investigation_id":"831828e5-711a-4123-a4ac-a35a12746d72","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":59,"page_slug":"spartan","prev_score":59,"reason":"Of 17 checked claims, 2 could not be assessed because the source blocked the reviewer and are left out. Of the remaining 15, 5 were disputed and 2 were unverifiable, which is about 47% and falls in the significant-issues band. The core allegation, a roughly $30 million flash loan exploit on BSC in May 2021, is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [2], [5]). The disputes are the stated 04:38 UTC attack time, which CoinDesk's report of a 00:21 UTC disclosure contradicts (claim_findings[1]), and the GitHub activity dates and the claim that development stopped in 2024, which the organisation page contradicts (claim_findings[7]-[10]). Because the disputes are peripheral to the core allegation and the reviewer's confidence is modest (0.55), the penalty sits at the low end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":15,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"significant","reason":"subject_status.contradicts_page is true, but only because the page says development has largely stopped since 2024 while front-end repositories were updated in 2026. No shutdown, exploit or sanction is left unmentioned and there are no omission findings. The percentage band already reflects this issue (claim_findings[7])."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}