Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Lodestar Finance
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 32 → 20 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424312463
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-04T20:05:47.755Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AKoLqU7djmDnq3fgLaVaKnbcLzzauNTGHHbJFJ8Kizis
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1683 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T20:05:47.391Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"9f16c147-d747-4bcb-ad79-43f72fbaf199","new_score":20,"page_slug":"lodestar-finance","prev_score":32,"reason":"The review confirmed 19 of 25 claims with strong corroboration across Tier 1 sources, and the core exploit narrative — date, mechanism, loss amount, and fund flow — is well-supported. However, claim_findings[21] and claim_findings[22] contain a material factual error in the Pre-Exploit Audit section: the page states the SourceHat audit 'did not flag the GLPOracle price manipulation vector as a critical vulnerability' and reported 'no critical findings, 18 medium-severity improvements, and 2 gas optimization suggestions.' The SourceHat audit (Tier 1) directly contradicts this — it flagged the GLPOracle vulnerability as a High severity finding (Finding #1, marked Resolved), and the 18-medium / 2-gas figures belong to the post-exploit Hats Finance competition, not the pre-exploit audit. These two disputed claims are confirmed as erroneous by the primary audit document, and together they materially misrepresent the security posture narrative. Additionally, the CoinTelegraph citation (claim_findings[7]) is dead (HTTP 404) and appears in the timeline and sources list. The LODE token price drop figure (claim_findings[6]) is disputed between 53% and ~70% across sources, with the cited URL also dead. Revision to the audit section and citation cleanup are required before this page accurately represents the record.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}