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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Bitget
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#6
Score
33 → 33 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
450200281
Off-chain at
2026-09-25T01:10:11.918Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
88CxYxLm6gwXYXUGAnnvvg5ZRpp4XiBaP5TDGpcwjXgT
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2354 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"9e55fd9c78199b38bd7f2f7eebc49355","decided_at":"2026-09-25T01:10:11.689Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.16,"findings_hash":"4FDToqXS2e9GvRhhZbyNNUvqZsrf7xrBwsStMk1LBpz8","investigation_id":"1297716a-0f85-4f49-905d-8e9cddae14b8","new_score":33,"page_content_hash":"bf61140ead915c81eeaf99eee268a673ba9ed6eebbe6f30fd1b92f385c91fc85","page_slug":"bitget","prev_score":33,"reason":"The page's central claim — a confirmed ~$351.6M September 24, 2026 hot/warm wallet hack, with the CEO's statements, User Protection Fund figures, and the wider 2026 loss-comparison context — is well supported by multiple independent, contemporaneous tier-2 sources and checks out against live fetches of the cited URLs. The regulatory history (AMF, MAS/Singapore, Hong Kong, Philippines, UK/FCA, MiCA), the BitKeep predecessor breaches, the token-listing disputes (Floki/TokenFi, ReelStar, ZachXBT allegations), and the Proof-of-Reserves figures are all accurately sourced and, where checked against primary documents (AMF, Bitget's own PoR page), match precisely. Two material problems were found: (1) the Trustpilot section understates the severity of Bitget's current customer-review standing (page says ~3.1/5 from 2,500+ reviews; the live cited page shows 1.8/5 'Poor' from 1,713 reviews); and (2) the Gracy Chen/Hyperliquid 'fake DEX' anecdote is dated a full year late — the JELLY incident that triggered it occurred in March 2025, not 2026, per CoinDesk, Halborn, and the tweet's own timestamp, an error that propagates into both the prose and the timeline. Separately, the MAS-Singapore timeline entry places the suspension in December 2021 when the more specific reporting (Protos, consistent with Bloomberg's account) indicates MAS actually withdrew the exemption around July 2021, with December marking only when the story broke publicly. The France section is also stale in that it presents the 2023/2024 AMF warnings as the current status without noting Bitget's subsequent full withdrawal from the French market in March 2026. None of these issues undermine the page's core, freshly-added hack narrative, which is the primary driver of the trust-score change under review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}