Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Taiko L2 Bridge Exploit June 2026
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 22 → 22 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443519707
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T08:08:38.746Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EA31PwyJe9CSezvPMw8RcHbMN2a9KntD4TqvdqqXZjoR
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1486 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T08:08:38.532Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"ef51aa99-9639-4d3d-a2cb-0e03d1142485","new_score":22,"page_slug":"taiko-l2-bridge-exploit-june-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The page's core factual claims about the Taiko bridge exploit (loss amount, SGX key exposure as root cause, attack mechanics, fault resting with Taiko's own operational security, and market impact) are well corroborated by multiple independent, credible sources, with unusually precise technical details (RSA-3072, enclave-key.pem, MrSigner, processMessage/RETRIABLE/retryMessage, PR #21820's four fixes) matching cited sources closely. The main defect found is that the page's recovery-status narrative is stale: it stops at a June 28, 2026 'plan published, PR unmerged' snapshot, while multiple independent sources confirm the bridge was fully reopened, recollateralized, and all affected users made whole within about two weeks of the exploit -- a fact the page as reviewed does not reflect despite the review occurring roughly two months later. Minor issues include one dead pair of cited MEXC source URLs (still substantively supported elsewhere), one attributed claim (Invezz) with no traceable citation in the page's own source list, and an internally inconsistent CoinCodex source that the page does not flag.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}