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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
44 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443523190
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T03:34:06.869Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DR4y5zJc5cwmmeFpUo7R5RxeoATkPxrA74gBaSjXodLX
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1895 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:34:06.632Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"643728b0-3635-4fe2-98f3-9b1adc3107f5","new_score":4,"page_slug":"cryptojs-ill-bloom-weak-rng-multi-wallet-drain-cve-2026-71851","prev_score":4,"reason":"Of 30 claims checked, 27 were confirmed directly against primary sources (the GitHub Security Advisory, Coinspect's own investigation posts, and independent press), none were disputed, and only 1 was unverifiable with 2 rated partially supported. Disputed_pct is 3.3%, well within the approve band. The page's most falsifiable claim -- the CVE identifier, its CVSS score/vector, affected version range, and the 3.2.0/3.2.1-then-reverted-in-3.3.0 detail (claim_findings[1]-[4]) -- was checked against the primary advisory itself and matches precisely. The page's most alarmable claim, that this flaw caused actual multi-wallet drains rather than a merely theoretical risk (claim_findings[12]), is corroborated by matching dollar figures, wallet counts, and per-chain breakdowns across the advisory and multiple independent outlets -- it does not overstate a capability as a realized loss. The two partially_supported findings (claim_findings[10] and claim_findings[28]) concern timeline dates stated with first-of-month precision that isn't independently corroborated to the day, consistent with a known rounding artifact rather than a substantive factual error. The single unverifiable finding (claim_findings[27]) is the page generalizing a source's narrower, single-incident statement about CertiK into a broader ecosystem-risk claim -- a minor overreach in a background section, not a core allegation. Coverage gaps are all medium or low priority, so no escalation is warranted on that basis.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}