Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Sharwa.Finance
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 22 (-16)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464358382
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T04:19:19.867Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T04:19:32.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T04:19:32.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BRVXPBHJ2XH2nUQwyMNytBJrD18frgia5usewWL8CZsi
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1483 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"cf129dd8c5a8f32ccf00d82416ceddd4","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:19:19.606Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3636,"investigation_id":"833401a1-ffcb-4c74-95d6-404dedd094a9","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":22,"page_slug":"sharwafinance","prev_score":38,"reason":"The core October 2025 exploit facts (date, amount, pools, attacker addresses, flash loan route, Pashov audit findings) were confirmed against Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. Four of 11 claims (about 36%) could not be verified: the $40,000 recovery (claim_findings[2]), the ZachXBT-associated flag in the body and the summary (claim_findings[5], [6]), and the Verichains publication date (claim_findings[10]). The claim that the fix was dropped from the new deployment is stated more strongly than the sources allow (claim_findings[4]), and the TVL and rank figures are out of date (claim_findings[8]). The unverified items are mostly secondary to the core exploit narrative, so the penalty sits at the low end of the significant band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-16,"score_limit":{"applied":-16,"limited":false,"proposed":-16,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-18},"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}