Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Aethir
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 36 → 36 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 453809193
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-06T05:36:17.750Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-06T05:36:54.211Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 48TZgFY7cD43wbaXBPLhwuGsAu3GyvksmnrN3aSfoiGM
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2075 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"6acd7315c0c75a672ab913575c3ff6fa","decided_at":"2026-10-06T05:36:17.573Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"HvvCzQoiU5yr4n9qXb85uHEGYPmMWn8gLk5kMXB4knTq","investigation_id":"70eb8857-f552-4eca-9b7a-e322535ed60d","mode":"findings_only","new_score":36,"page_content_hash":"6382235653a3f71184b5ab1dfb93d12dd0bb5fa00ab5a5f5e9345a70f8569e4c","page_slug":"aethir","prev_score":36,"reason":"The page's core narrative — Aethir's founding, funding history, tokenomics structure, the Season 3 airdrop redirection, and the April 2026 bridge exploit — is well supported by its cited sources and by independent reporting found during this review; dollar and date figures for the bridge exploit, the DAT redirection, and the tokenomics allocation all checked out exactly. Two clusters of real factual problems were found: (1) the node-sale description (100,000 licenses sold to '11,000 unique wallet addresses') is not supported by any source, including the two sources cited for it, and conflicts with Aethir's own 'Pausing' announcement and multiple outlets reporting ~73,000 licenses sold to 20,000+ buyers — this error is duplicated in the timeline; and (2) the ZachXBT flag claim, treated in the text as a contributing basis for the page's trust score, could not be substantiated at all — both of the section's own cited ZachXBT channels were fetched directly and contain zero mention of Aethir. A separate, lower-severity issue is an internal inconsistency between the summary ($147M+ ARR) and two sections of the same page ($167M ARR), which should be reconciled to one figure. A minor mismatch was also found in one illustrative phishing-domain example that doesn't match its cited source. Coverage gaps include the absence of any regulatory-history discussion and no on-chain insider wallet analysis despite the page itself flagging insider concentration as a risk factor.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}