Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 18 → 3 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462183061
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:06:50.142Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:07:14.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:07:14.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DuybmbAaaigEhMHFvNXBkLW4JHiazgGj4Y287TVnv57q
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1744 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"4784e0251f32840c4509e4e64af6ff1b","band_override":null,"blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:06:49.839Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3636,"investigation_id":"4feace03-6746-48e9-a625-9cd1ac6e6351","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":3,"page_slug":"summer-finance-summer-fi-lazy-summer-protocol-flash-loan-exploit-and-shutdown","prev_score":18,"reason":"Of 14 claims checked, 3 could not be checked because the source blocked the reviewer and were left out of the count. Of the remaining 11, 2 were disputed (claim_findings[0] and [1]: the Series A is dated August 2023 but was announced in April 2022) and 2 could not be verified (claim_findings[2], the 2016 start date, and claim_findings[13], the Stream Finance figures), giving about 36%, which falls in the significant-issues band. The core incident account (the $6.04M exploit, the root cause, the Tornado Cash routing and the July 15 wind-down) is corroborated by independent reporting, and the disputed items are background rather than the central allegation, so the penalty sits at the mild end of the band. The 8-of-6 multisig figure is almost certainly a typo and the Guardian section contains leftover drafting text, both of which need correcting. The reviewer's confidence was moderate and the primary Summer.fi post-mortem was unreachable, so several detailed figures remain unchecked.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-15,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}