Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Taiko Ethereum L2 Bridge Exploit
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 15 → 7 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506724
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-10T18:28:49.712Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4S5u9jRdcLffWxH3shqewZThmJPPHA7z993TvM6mogAq
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1270 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-10T18:28:49.448Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"7c829a4d-1a89-4901-91bb-62f3cff14f24","new_score":7,"page_slug":"taiko-ethereum-l2-bridge-exploit","prev_score":15,"reason":"The core narrative of this page — the June 22, 2026 Taiko bridge exploit, the ~$1.7M loss, the leaked SGX/Raiko signing key root cause, and the attack mechanics — is well supported, with 12 of 15 reviewed claims confirmed and zero disputed claims (claim_findings[0], [2], [4]-[7]). The page requires revision, however, because its Recovery Plan section is out of date: claim_findings[10] found PR #21820 was actually merged the day after it opened and the bridge was fully restored with users made whole roughly a week and a half later, while the page still frames recovery as pending. This is corroborated by a high-priority coverage gap (coverage_gaps[0]) flagging the same stale framing. Two additional claims were rated only partially supported (claim_findings[8], [11]), including one hedge in the page itself that undersells how well the affected contract addresses are actually corroborated.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}