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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · UPCX
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
28 → 10 (-18)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464357329
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T04:15:33.289Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T04:15:47.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T04:15:47.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BvQjLzBGf9hUft73fgDin64F5cxAZ15b2ESynuZirVpE
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1591 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"d6c1ed8ef6b2026faddfbb3e0dd95d0b","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:15:32.974Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4545,"investigation_id":"92255638-c0e0-4934-b6c1-4fba5bd21afc","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":10,"page_slug":"upcx","prev_score":28,"reason":"The core incident (April 1, 2025 exploit, about 18.4M UPC, about $70M, malicious ProxyAdmin upgrade, detection by Cyvers) is confirmed by Tier 2 sources (claim_findings[0], [5], [6]). However, 5 of 11 scored claims (about 45%, excluding one claim whose source blocked the reviewer) were disputed or unverifiable: the gap between the BitTrade listing and the hack is stated as 11 days when the page's own dates give 5 (claim_findings[1], [2]), and the ZachXBT flag, the pre-hack CertiK and Cyberscope audits, and the absence of a bounty could not be verified (claim_findings[4], [7], [8]). The 'entirely' multisig causation also overstates a hedged source (claim_findings[3]). Because the central allegation holds and reviewer confidence is moderate, the penalty sits in the lower part of the significant band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-18,"score_limit":{"applied":-18,"limited":false,"proposed":-18,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-18},"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}