Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:32:58.981Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"cb094bff-6724-4483-9acf-fad4d5cebb15","new_score":4,"page_slug":"zklend-starknet","prev_score":12,"reason":"Of 28 checked claims, 23 were confirmed, 3 partially supported, and 2 disputed, putting the raw disputed rate at about 7% -- within the approval range on its own. But both disputed findings (sections[1] and timeline[3]) are the same underlying mistake stated twice: the page attributes the attacker's later, post-conversion ETH balance (2,930 ETH, from around April 1, 2025, just before it was lost to a phishing site) to the composition of the original February 12 exploit, when the page's own cited source describes that day's drain as 'over 2,200 ETH.' Separately, two partially-supported findings (sections[5] and the earlier '$200,000 ... to affected users' framing) describe the final $200,000 treasury allocation as though it were the totality of what depositors recovered, when the page's own recovery-portal and compensation-plan sources document an earlier multi-stage refund process that had already reduced the shortfall before that figure was announced. The review also raised a high-priority coverage gap noting the page's narrative stops at the June 2025 shutdown with no account of developments since, including reports of partial recoveries; that gap, combined with the two remediation-framing issues, is enough to warrant revision even though the disputed-claims percentage alone would not be. The rest of the page -- the exploit mechanism, fund-movement tracing, the hedged EraLend attribution, and the bounty/response timeline -- held up well under independent verification.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}