Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Gate.io
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 42 → 30 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426285096
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-13T21:58:58.046Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- G9NRzJnNrJjwGynKgaYUba4YUvGiXpCTApFVUeGU8sVc
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1319 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-13T21:58:57.796Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"ba1440aa-37bd-4263-9369-af270f4a4a8d","new_score":30,"page_slug":"gateio","prev_score":42,"reason":"21 of 29 claims are confirmed; 6 are partially supported and 0 are directly disputed, placing disputed_pct at approximately 21% (10–30% band). The most material issue is claim_findings[22–23]: the page states Gate.io 'declined to compensate' traders following the June 2025 $LA futures price spike, but multiple independent sources confirm Gate.io publicly committed approximately $30 million to cover negative-balance holders — a significant omission that materially misrepresents the exchange's documented response. Secondary issues include an understated dollar value in the ETC 51% attack ($200K reported vs. ~$271.5K across sources, claim_findings[20]) and an unverified FinCEN registration claim for Gate US (claim_findings[6]). Three high-priority coverage gaps — including the $LA incident's regulatory follow-up, unverified jurisdiction-blocking orders, and the secondhand basis for the $230M hack claim — push the penalty toward the upper end of the minor band.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}