Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 12 → 12 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457752707
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T19:23:54.763Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T19:24:01.413Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5ANwNpPbQGWbWh5HPt3Sy8LhRX2hg748V7xudBrvtSws
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2106 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"242bea93d959e0355fa151ed584c8368","decided_at":"2026-10-16T19:23:54.344Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4091,"findings_hash":"ECEJrbMk6XXokpCMCy2SGdTsZ9nSShhWL5d5boMAGzb7","investigation_id":"5f8cd172-049b-43de-a6aa-f72f42130964","mode":"findings_only","new_score":12,"page_content_hash":"490cfe21fc654f162d9ceb903cdb50b00e9897fb48fd449549722a6b245888c0","page_slug":"crosscurve-formerly-eywa-bridge-exploit-feb-2026","prev_score":12,"reason":"The core technical narrative of the page is strong and independently verifiable against primary on-chain data: the exploit date/time/block (Feb 1, 2026, 18:38:23 UTC, block 24,363,854), the expressExecute()/ReceiverAxelar root cause, the contract and attacker addresses, the attack transaction, and the ~999.8M EYWA token movement all check out exactly against Etherscan. The loss-figure reconciliation ($1.4M liquid vs. $3M total TVL vs. BlockSec's $2.76M) is handled with appropriate nuance and is corroborated by multiple independent security write-ups. However, the page contains a cluster of date errors in its background and periphery sections: the EYWA founding date (claimed December 2020, but company-data aggregators say 2021, and the cited source supports no date at all), the Egorov seed-round date (claimed September 2023, but the cited press release itself and several funding-data aggregators date it to May 2024, also with an unsupported upper bound on the funding amount), a fabricated 'probing' date of January 31, 2026 that is not actually described by its cited source and conflicts with the confirmed on-chain Feb 1 timestamp, a Hyperbridge exploit incorrectly placed in the 'February 2026' attack cluster when a more specific, credible report dates it to April 2026, and an unconfirmed detail (a later 20% bounty escalation, and a MixBytes 'war room') that could not be corroborated anywhere despite extensive searching, despite being stated as fact.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}