Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · zkLend (Starknet)
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 12 → 12 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521094
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T12:32:59.097Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BdXu4uBnw3oAXkGuuWstVJ8qfPH9JSgiUyXJzAq7RfeH
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1442 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:32:58.981Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"cb094bff-6724-4483-9acf-fad4d5cebb15","new_score":12,"page_slug":"zklend-starknet","prev_score":12,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- exploit mechanism, attacker fund movements, the EraLend attribution, the bounty offer, and the shutdown announcement -- is well sourced and independently corroborated across multiple credible outlets and the BlockSec/SlowMist technical analyses. The most significant defects are an internal-arithmetic conflation of the exploit-day ETH drain (~2,200 ETH) with the later post-conversion consolidated figure (2,930 ETH) that was subsequently lost to a phishing site, repeated in both a section and a timeline entry, and an overstated framing of the $200,000 final treasury allocation as the totality of what affected users received when earlier recovery-portal compensation (full refunds to unaffected-pool depositors, partial refunds to affected-pool depositors) is documented in the page's own cited sources. Two sources cited in the page body are missing from the sources_used list. No dead links were found among the sources actually checked; two Medium.com URLs returned 403 to direct fetch but were confirmed live and content-matching via independent search.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}