Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Lulo
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 60 → 55 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425200842
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-08T22:26:15.488Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DcLNQueSSio8uoNv2fPZdcX4iked6R6fNk3UVgY1UxPh
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1360 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-08T22:26:15.293Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"04a32c20-2ba5-48d5-afb8-13498a20b9ce","new_score":55,"page_slug":"lulo","prev_score":60,"reason":"The review confirmed 18 of 28 extracted claims outright, with zero claims found to be disputed by independent sources. The five partially_supported findings are limited in severity: the $86.4M TVL figure (claim_findings[2] and claim_findings[19]) is a dated historical data point that has since declined to approximately $78M per DefiLlama, and Solana Ventures investor status (claim_findings[5] and claim_findings[22]) lacks a confirmable primary source. The unverifiable findings (claim_findings[10], claim_findings[21]) are standard absence-of-evidence claims appropriate to security and regulatory sections. Revision is recommended rather than approval because of a high-priority coverage gap: the Certora audit (claim_findings[11]-[12]) identified critical-severity vulnerabilities in oracle update handling, referral fees, and withdrawal logic, and the remediation status of those findings is not publicly confirmed — a material open question for a protocol holding approximately $78 million in user deposits.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}