Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · CrossCurve (formerly EYWA) Bridge Exploit (Feb 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 22 → 12 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425238740
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T02:37:56.151Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HBNghmmfz25VjdSFqVk5gjevV13bmVXJKnFUjTX9iuit
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1657 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T02:37:55.869Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"5f8cd172-049b-43de-a6aa-f72f42130964","new_score":12,"page_slug":"crosscurve-formerly-eywa-bridge-exploit-feb-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The page's core technical claims — exploit mechanism, contract addresses, transaction hashes, confirmed loss figures, affected chain list, and team response — are all substantiated by multiple credible sources and carry no meaningful dispute. The disputed_pct of 16.7% is driven by one confirmed factual error and several minor unverifiable details. The most significant issue is claim_findings[24]: the Hyperbridge exploit is placed in a 'February 2026 Bridge Attack Wave' section, but two Tier 1 sources (The Block, Hyperbridge's own post-mortem) confirm it occurred on April 13, 2026 — approximately ten weeks after the CrossCurve attack. Additionally, claim_findings[19] and timeline[7] assert a 20% bounty escalation on February 5, but no available source supports this figure or date, and the cited QuillAudits Medium article does not mention it. The specific naming of Chainalysis and TRM Labs in claim_findings[20] is also unverifiable from public reporting. These issues are confined to contextual and response-detail sections and do not affect the accuracy of the exploit analysis itself. Revision is warranted to correct the Hyperbridge date framing, remove or caveat the 20% bounty claim, and address the MixBytes audit count gap flagged as high-priority.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}