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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Taiko
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#2
Score
38 → 38 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443526568
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T17:07:40.426Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
2sLKgSNWNkuJTsuTzcUoKZgXApzAMuntm9iFDepuXvcK
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1372 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T17:07:40.337Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"acbf7d40-7b57-4717-869d-bcf63a1d1f69","new_score":38,"page_slug":"taiko","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page's core technical characterization of Taiko (Ethereum-equivalent Type 1 zkEVM, based contestable rollup, SGX+ZK multi-proof design) and the mechanics of the June 2026 bridge exploit (SGX enclave key leak, MrSigner forgery, $1.7M loss, wallet addresses) are well supported by primary and independent secondary sources. The most significant defects are a misattributed security firm (the page credits BlockSec where its own cited sources credit Blockaid/PeckShield and Quill Audits) and a stale incident-response narrative that omits the bridge's July 2, 2026 full reopening and reported user reimbursement, leaving the impression of an unresolved incident. Several specific L2BEAT-sourced governance parameters (exit-window absence, exact permissionless delay periods, 80.2% TVS concentration) could not be independently confirmed due to access limits on the live L2BEAT page. One timeline date (the SP1/Plonky3 disclosure) is a first-of-month placeholder that does not match the actual January 27, 2025 primary-source date.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}