Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Allbridge Core
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 49 → 49 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464296225
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:37:07.745Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:37:34.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:37:34.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8c42WUSwvhnWnMX88izWive2F7c2a9JKdaaTtXP9PQnX
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2080 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"0da084f355aa3dfe776d768a2ff04c84","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:37:07.522Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"69b33041-8d59-4e35-a72d-e8a0fc25ba5c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":49,"page_slug":"allbridge-core","prev_score":49,"reason":"The page's account of the April 2023 BNB Chain exploit holds up where sources could be read (claim_findings[0] confirmed, claim_findings[1] partly supported). Of the 4 findings that could be checked, 1 (ZachXBT flag, claim_findings[5]) could not be corroborated, giving 25% by claim count, and a Kudelski audit date in the timeline conflicts with the page's own December 2022 statement (claim_findings[2]). The main problem is omission: the page does not mention the July 19-20, 2026 Solana flash loan exploit (about $1.65M), the pause of Core, or the announced wind-down of Core and Classic, and its claim that the redesign makes profitable single-transaction exploits impossible is undercut by that incident. Two of the six claims could not be read because the sources blocked the reviewer, which limits coverage but does not count against the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":4,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"The claim percentage (1 of 4 countable findings, 25%, after leaving out 2 source_blocked findings) implies the minor band. The review reports a critical omission (the July 2026 Solana flash loan exploit of about $1.65M and the Core pause), a material omission (announced wind-down of Core and Classic) and subject_status.contradicts_page = true. The page presents Core as an operating, hardened protocol, so the verdict is escalated to the significant band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}