Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · node-gyp npm Supply Chain Compromise (June 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-14)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443513902
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T12:55:30.514Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7TJn9cRsvThRaiWhzHBLSwdk9MEA1UC2JT33A5PV7GEy
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2294 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T12:55:30.316Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"10622728-729b-44eb-90d4-6ea9f25dae1a","new_score":0,"page_slug":"node-gyp-npm-supply-chain-compromise-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core scaffolding -- campaign scale, the Phantom Gyp/binding.gyp mechanism, the Wave 1/Wave 2 timeline, and exact package and version figures -- is confirmed with high precision against multiple independently fetched vendor sources (claim_findings[0], [3], [6], [18]), and the raw disputed-plus-unverifiable rate is a low 12.5% (4 of 32 claims). However, two issues push this above a clean approval. First, nine of 32 findings are only 'partially_supported,' and several of them are not benign imprecision: claim_findings[7] shows the page's four-stage payload description conflicts with a materially different architecture in one of its own cited sources (ReversingLabs) without flagging the disagreement, and claim_findings[15] and [16] present specific persistence-mechanism names, timers, and AI-assistant file paths that could not be traced to the sources cited for them. Claim_findings[29] is an outright disputed timeline entry: the page's own cited source was published three days before the date the timeline attributes its reporting to. Second, and more consequential, the review identifies a high-priority coverage gap: while the body text correctly states that the genuine node-gyp package and its maintainers were not backdoored (claim_findings[5]), the page's title, slug, and entity name ('node-gyp npm Supply Chain Compromise') can be read as implying the legitimate, widely-depended-upon node-gyp tool itself was compromised. That framing risk is invisible to the disputed_pct metric, which only scores body-text claims, not title/entity naming. A second high-priority gap notes a possible unreported Microsoft/GitHub impact. Together these findings warrant revision -- clarifying the entity framing and resolving the timeline date and payload-description discrepancies -- rather than a clean approval or a denial, given that the substantive factual record otherwise holds up well.","score_delta":-14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}