Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · SolvBTC
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 23 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464357635
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T04:16:50.268Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T04:16:52.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T04:16:52.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FZppyM98VgYK6Rie9nq8uctm9yRdgKPzocpDN55jwB3y
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1414 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"66a30ead7b52e577ed9f36347b8ddbf4","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:16:50.034Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.5455,"investigation_id":"243aa43a-27c9-4bd1-9794-e5923d008b77","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":23,"page_slug":"solvbtc","prev_score":38,"reason":"Of 11 claims checked, 2 were disputed and 4 could not be verified, giving a disputed rate of about 55%. The core March 2026 exploit facts (date, amount, mechanics, response) were confirmed (claim_findings[2], [3]). However, the page misattributes to Halborn a 'not reentrancy' view when Halborn calls it a classic reentrancy exploit (claim_findings[0]), and the confirmation date appears to be March 5, not March 6 (claim_findings[1]). The TVL figures, audits, DeFiLlama figure and a named role could not be confirmed, so the penalty is kept at the low end of the band because the reviewer's confidence was moderate and most unverified items were simply not checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-15,"score_limit":{"applied":-15,"limited":false,"proposed":-15,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-16},"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}