Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Leo Platform npm Supply Chain Attack (June 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 3 → 0 (-20)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465095210
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-04T00:09:51.589Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-04T00:10:20.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-04T00:10:20.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ES1Z4wWNtuNFfqDQfu8SqTqteYAvihY7m2shYdgaj4L8
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1495 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"e48c32d802e59e0b4b1218508aade627","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T00:09:51.357Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.375,"investigation_id":"8655eeea-1d2f-4d0d-b554-e117ba889570","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":0,"page_slug":"leo-platform-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":3,"reason":"The core incident facts (20 packages, 23:04:55 UTC, about 13,600 weekly downloads, the Phantom Gyp trigger and the fake Dependabot branches) match StepSecurity and SafeDep (claim_findings[0], [5], [6]). However, 3 of 8 claims (37.5%) were disputed or could not be verified: the upgrade-after-compromise remediation advice conflicts with the cited sources (claim_findings[7]), and the liuende501/236-repository and C2/killswitch details were not found in them (claim_findings[2], [3]). Separately, a real person's name is attached to the compromised czirker account without support (claim_findings[1]) and should be removed. The penalty is kept in the middle of the band because the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.55) and the correction to the remediation advice rests on search text rather than a fetched page.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":-20,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}