Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 10 → 10 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457972937
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T08:37:57.026Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T08:38:05.290Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 78NnoaMmfeEfyNCfsHjbbk5xtVXAfpzrpos4vqk9eK6c
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2213 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"93f723611c38d44263856b69b12593c6","decided_at":"2026-10-17T08:37:56.780Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.125,"findings_hash":"B9qnp8Fo9Whbt2HkzmgL8W87Q41ZAd5VqKx9MLypQi2z","investigation_id":"73a3321a-cc8e-4ddc-8492-7393d29c4f78","mode":"findings_only","new_score":10,"page_content_hash":"ac43b2341245ecb6961919274cb390356914266366b2612fa46114777d31494e","page_slug":"lien-finance-bond-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"The page's core factual claims about the July 24, 2026 Lien Finance exploit are well supported: the date, the ~$542,144.63 USDC loss figure, the exchangeEquivalentBonds/_calcRateBondToErc20 mechanism, and all on-chain addresses and the transaction hash were independently verified against a directly-fetched Verichains technical writeup and corroborated by CryptoTimes, crypto.news, and Odaily. The broader July 2026 DeFi-incident context (AFX Trade, B2 Network, Verus Bridge, Lazy Summer, Bonzo Finance, Cascade) and the 'no statement from Lien Finance' claim both check out against independent sources, with no evidence of later developments that would make the page stale as of this review (October 2026). The clearest defect is in the 'Historical Context' section and its matching timeline entry: both describe the 2020 Lien Finance incident using 'equivalence function'/'empty bond group' language that the page's own cited primary source (samczsun's firsthand account) does not support — that account instead describes a free-mint/burn Ether-drain bug. This appears to be an import from later tertiary reporting rather than a reading of the cited source, and is flagged as disputed in two places under one defect group. A second, more minor issue is a claim that a second contract address was itself 'affected' by the exploit, which the section's own cited source does not state (it only cites that address as a source-code reference). One cited CryptoTimes URL could not be directly fetched due to a bot-check wall, though its content was reasonably corroborated by independent sources.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}