Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457704998
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T16:31:21.246Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T16:31:22.552Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8xMFtZR1bakSb1MrRXK4YunaFXDgJUyx36eCyq1EpzJ6
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2534 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"238bab94bdd95a178a59bfa77ead107f","decided_at":"2026-10-16T16:31:21.019Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1765,"findings_hash":"8jyxKfBVVKgoNntCMfuy16rZBBufsGBfxHiKg1cdgygv","investigation_id":"c49012e3-b93a-4bfd-8c00-35468b644e6f","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"1dd846a88e473bfdfb4d112899681f823c5117e5e1a7de63fa61883666cfbd4d","page_slug":"dprk-lazarus-april-2026-635m-blitz-drift-kelp-combined-campaign","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a Drift Protocol exploit (~$285M, April 1, 2026) and a KelpDAO/LayerZero bridge exploit (~$292M, April 18, 2026), both attributed with analytics-based confidence to North Korea-linked actors — is well supported by the cited sources and by independent reporting from TRM Labs, Elliptic, Chainalysis, The Block, Decrypt, and LayerZero's own incident report. Attribution details (UNC4736/AppleJeus for Drift via the Radiant Capital link, TraderTraitor/UNC4899 for KelpDAO), attack mechanics (durable nonces, CarbonVote token, 1-of-1 DVN configuration, RPC node compromise), and most dollar figures and dates check out against primary and secondary sources. The most serious defect is a factual inversion: the page states the Arbitrum DAO voted on May 12, 2026 to 'implement a protocol-level lock' on the frozen KelpDAO funds, when higher-credibility reporting (The Block, Decrypt) shows the DAO actually voted around May 7-8, 2026 to RELEASE those funds to a recovery initiative — the opposite outcome. This error appears in both the KelpDAO Hack section and the timeline and traces to a single cited source whose own timestamp pre-dates the event it describes. Secondary issues include an unverifiable/conflicting CVT collateral and per-vault breakdown figure, a single-sourced $177M Aave bad-debt figure presented without hedging, an unconfirmed '80 incidents' count for 2025 DPRK activity, and a '2015 DPRK kidnapping' characterization of the litigation blocking the Arbitrum freeze that independent sources instead describe as broader consolidated terror-judgment cases. The page would also benefit from flagging that all 2026-campaign attribution rests on private-sector and victim-project statements rather than government confirmation, and from updating recovery-status language to reflect developments after its apparent July/August 2026 sourcing cutoff.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}