Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Nemo Yield Trading
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 60 → 60 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465085690
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-03T23:36:16.296Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-03T23:36:19.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-03T23:36:19.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6TEvEbDjXo22vuqUfV4RfTn6BXLVi6jboBHPec5AGHsK
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1470 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"ed028c84503d8d3addc1388570a4c4f0","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-03T23:36:16.048Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1429,"investigation_id":"20f595cd-4fa0-459f-930f-f424155f06bd","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":60,"page_slug":"nemo-yield-trading","prev_score":60,"reason":"The core account of the September 7, 2025 exploit, the single-developer unaudited deployment and the auditor warning 27 days earlier was confirmed by Tier 2 sources (claim_findings[0], [1], [5]). One of seven countable claims (about 14%) could not be verified: the MoveBit submission (claim_findings[2]). The Wormhole CCTP bridge route (claim_findings[3]) was only partly supported and may be wrong, since other outlets describe a route via Arbitrum and Circle. One finding (claim_findings[7]) was excluded because the source blocked the reviewer, and the review sampled only 2 of about 20 cited URLs. No material omissions were found and the page's dormant-protocol status matches the review's status check. The penalty is kept small because reviewer confidence is moderate to low.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}