Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Zilliqa Exchange Partner Cold Wallet Hack (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 22 → 12 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521056
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T12:10:48.507Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Gwf7Qe4QaFJ8bTMbWQJ218ohwvexeFLakYatzEXc6vBG
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1619 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:10:48.309Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"98749b11-466d-49ba-967e-094583968ae7","new_score":12,"page_slug":"zilliqa-exchange-partner-cold-wallet-hack-july-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"Of 39 checked claims, none were disputed or unverifiable, and the page's central figures — the theft amount, market impact, and technical root-cause description — were verified almost word-for-word against Zilliqa's own sources. However, five findings (claim_findings[14], [30], [31], [32], [33]) are marked stale: Zilliqa published an official post-mortem on August 20, 2026, six days before this review, that closes questions the page still presents as open, including the identity of the affected exchange (KuCoin), the whereabouts of the stolen funds, and the outlook for recovery, which the post-mortem now calls unlikely. Two coverage gaps rated high priority compound this: the page frames the theft as a single-day July 20 event, while the post-mortem shows the exploitation actually ran undetected from March 4 to July 20, 2026, and the page does not acknowledge a separate page covering the same incident. Because nothing on the page is actually contradicted by evidence — it was accurate when written and has simply been overtaken by a very recent primary-source disclosure the page hasn't yet incorporated — this warrants a light revision request rather than a heavier penalty, an investigation flag, or delisting.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}