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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · DMM Bitcoin
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#2
Score
10 → 10 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426697948
Off-chain at
2026-06-15T19:29:59.558Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9z7Cq5Fi2M17dbEga7grbgCvmB1v7wcEtgC5nbhoJm3p
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1194 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-15T19:29:59.396Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"e8972dc5-6b5b-4ab9-9e05-1974d92b8c54","new_score":10,"page_slug":"dmm-bitcoin","prev_score":10,"reason":"The DMM Bitcoin investigation page is substantially accurate in its core narrative: the May 2024 North Korean TraderTraitor hack, the 4,502.9 BTC amount, FSA business improvement order, and December 2024 closure announcement to SBI VC Trade are all confirmed by authoritative sources including the FBI and FSA. The main factual errors are two timeline dates that are off by weeks (the LinkedIn social engineering was 'late March' not March 1; the session cookie exploitation was 'after mid-May' not May 1), and the FSA order date is wrong by 25 days (September 26, not September 1). The 'eighth-largest theft in history' claim is approximately correct at time of writing but may be stale. The characterization of the attack as a 'supply-chain attack' is a slight overstatement of what was actually a social engineering attack on a vendor employee.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}