Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Voltage Finance
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 25 → 20 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423878331
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-02T20:04:22.696Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- E134FiYDZiJDtEAAMUt38J2moR6BNnjaQFaQpfx8xzjs
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1265 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-02T20:04:22.537Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a0f97084-611a-43c6-bef3-3b6e998f63a6","new_score":20,"page_slug":"voltage-finance","prev_score":25,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 20 of 29 claims outright, with zero claims disputed by credible sources. The verdict is review_revise rather than approve on the strength of two factors: first, claim_findings[2] is rated stale — the page states VOLT has a maximum supply of 10 billion, but the protocol's own May 2025 blog post and CoinGecko (Tier 1) confirm emissions were paused in February 2025, fixing the actual supply permanently at approximately 8.73 billion; this factual overstatement should be corrected. Second, the reviewer identified a high-priority coverage gap in pre-exploit security audit history — whether any audit preceded the 2022 reentrancy vulnerability or the 2025 access-control failure is material to user risk assessment and is unaddressed on the page. The core exploit findings, asset amounts, attacker addresses, and timeline are all well-corroborated and require no substantive correction.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}