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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Allbridge
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
28 → 28 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
459460240
Off-chain at
2026-10-21T02:20:15.398Z
Anchored at
2026-10-21T02:20:38.548Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
pWBjHUCrGkkLnb1mcUJwcBHEh2yQ2npxU9mZP5tnxYm
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1839 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"a8fa8ffa8ce5576843648be668f3bdad","decided_at":"2026-10-21T02:20:15.246Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2222,"findings_hash":"HpFLrrcWQEU8eqoZDAKSR7UXkpK4qB5SzoBADMTq6h6K","investigation_id":"c2440c5d-c86e-4b7d-bb6a-f3a485c94fe2","mode":"findings_only","new_score":28,"page_content_hash":"7c79c25e02c7a02d6707030f113830f246ad911bd8d052c3ddc0799c8f137425","page_slug":"allbridge","prev_score":28,"reason":"The page's core narrative — three distinct security incidents (April 2023 BNB Chain flash loan, July 2026 Solana flash loan, August 2026 Base CCTP forgery) with a recurring flash-loan vulnerability class — is well supported by multiple independent, credible outlets (CoinDesk, Cointelegraph, The Block, SlowMist/KuCoin) and the specific technical mechanics (Kamino loan amount, Aave flash loan amount, six-second attack window, forged MessageTransmitterV2 call) check out against corroborating reporting. Two concrete numeric/date errors were found and are correctable: the April 2023 BUSD loss figure is overstated by about $7,000 relative to the widely-cited PeckShield breakdown (appearing in both prose and timeline), and the timeline date recorded for SlowMist's August 2026 post-mortem (2026-08-01) precedes the exploit it analyzes by over two weeks and should be approximately 2026-08-22. Two citations (BitcoinWorld, LCX) are dead links needing an archive swap or removal. The 'CCTP Alliance Program' label could not be verified as a real named Circle program, appearing twice. The founder/HQ sentence in Protocol Overview is not actually backed by any of its four cited sources and omits a co-founder identified by independent sources.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}