Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Kame Aggregator
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 53 → 53 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464299940
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:50:40.094Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:50:47.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:50:47.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3GYe6oJZUHPvZYsGsuHaiLZHHDUwadSPKtiTcR4WwnVA
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1593 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3656fdfe743bdde4d6fb3fb2b0e861b8","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:50:39.773Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2857,"investigation_id":"fc3166bc-cdac-442b-a51b-eae4fce81fe4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":53,"page_slug":"kame-aggregator","prev_score":53,"reason":"The core exploit figures (about $1.3245M drained, 830 users, about $946k returned, 20% bounty) match the team's own post-mortem (claim_findings[1], [3]), and no claim was outright disputed. Of 14 countable findings (one blocked founder-name check excluded), 4 could not be verified, about 29%, which falls in the minor-issues band. The main weaknesses are the exploit date, which primary sources put on September 12 rather than 13 (claim_findings[0]), the compensation total of $1,031,115 whose only apparent source is a dead mexc.com link (claim_findings[10], [11], [12]), and a $356,438 secondary-exploiter figure that is derived rather than reported (claim_findings[4]). The omissions are minor and the reviewer found no evidence of a shutdown; current operating status remains an open high-priority gap. The reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.55), so the penalty is kept in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":14,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}