Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Coinkite / Coldcard
- Sequence
- #9
- Score
- 5 → 5 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 460729263
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-24T05:20:03.848Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-24T05:20:15.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-24T05:20:15.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HK1Dpu7rqrt28tfcivUtk6r2rSdrExE5FddchSA732ji
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2443 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"3a5b5234ace7f7623026410fd0e64768","decided_at":"2026-10-24T05:20:03.652Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1143,"findings_hash":"F7c1Eo6AxqqJVYzRjDQ35gMxvGqaLhbCEtXzaP4vTiX1","investigation_id":"fa3e4739-2493-471f-b16a-4a0503f66079","mode":"findings_only","new_score":5,"page_content_hash":"d57a2db786d5e008b360c5d1f27819c95230a56caee4a25f154ca5d19df40a48","page_slug":"coinkite-coldcard","prev_score":5,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- a five-year-old build-configuration flaw in Coldcard firmware collapsing seed entropy, exploited from July 30, 2026 in multiple waves for a total in the range of $116-155 million, a prior May 2025 warning from James O'Beirne that Coinkite reportedly dismissed, and O'Beirne's subsequent allegation linking CTO Peter Gray to the pseudonymous 'switck' GitHub account via GPG-signed commits -- is well supported by the page's own cited sources and by independent corroboration gathered in this review. Figures that vary across outlets ($116M vs $130M vs $155M) are appropriately flagged by the page itself as reflecting different measurement timestamps during an ongoing, evolving event. Two significant problems were found: the page's description of a distinct 'second wave' on July 31 (594 BTC/$38M/500 wallets) actually describes an early, partial estimate of the same July 30 first wave according to a detailed independent wave-by-wave reconstruction, and this error is repeated in both the Attack Timeline section and the corresponding timeline entry. Separately, a quotation attributed to Kraken's chief security officer calling for 'mandatory independent entropy testing' could not be located in any source and appears to be a fabricated or invented quote; the closest real statements describe a call for independent verification, not a mandate. Minor overreach was also found in the '90% unmoved' statistic (not stated by the cited TRM source) and the 'systemic vulnerability' framing around the 85-bug AI audit (the cited article never uses that word and hedges its conclusions). The most significant coverage gap is that the page appears not to have been updated since early-to-mid August 2026, while loss totals, recovery efforts, and laundering activity have continued to evolve through the current date.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":9,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}