Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Kelp DAO
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 32 → 32 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443519397
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T06:06:25.377Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 38QKfH3gSiS5df8u3TZqWzzdSp3zMQw85tvUGmTwSWZm
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1127 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T06:06:25.094Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"70aa1b03-25c0-46a1-9a98-454053e9d96a","new_score":32,"page_slug":"kelp-dao","prev_score":32,"reason":"The page's account of the April 2026 exploit, its causes, the LayerZero blame dispute and subsequent apology, systemic DeFi contagion, and the DeFi United recovery is closely and accurately sourced to credible tier-1 reporting, and the page appropriately distinguishes sourced facts (team's public dispute response) from the incident itself rather than asserting an unsupported 'inactive team' narrative. Weaknesses include an understated pre-exploit peak TVL figure, a temporal conflation of depositor/integration metrics from different periods, an inferential overreach linking a distinct AWS Lambda centralization risk to the exploit's actual (LayerZero DVN) cause, and an outdated framing of the post-exploit bridge status that omits the well-documented Chainlink CCIP migration.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}