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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
publish · ACryptoS
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#1
Score
→
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
468921910
Off-chain at
2026-11-13T12:11:27.121Z
Anchored at
2026-11-13T12:11:56.000Z
Block time
2026-11-13T12:11:56.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
A8UMQqzg6qxsToThotKpf8D1krGd9fULhPpL3BUTbaWX
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (6551 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"159d7cd9-5c82-4b88-a0f2-ebe7181b4473","kind":"publish","page_slug":"acryptos","published_at":"2026-11-13T12:11:26.977Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"ACryptoS","sections":[{"content":"On November 8, 2026, ACryptoS suffered an exploit affecting 77 vaults spread across five blockchain networks: Arbitrum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Base, and Optimism. Security firm SlowMist recorded losses of approximately $665,000 (reported variously as $665,000 and $665,429) resulting from the incident. According to post-attack analysis reported by crypto.news, the root cause was a missing input-validation check in a multi-token deposit function (referred to in reporting as depositMulti), which allowed an attacker to submit a token list shorter than the number of assets a vault expected. This discrepancy let the attacker mint a disproportionately large share of a vault's total shares using only a small deposit, which could then be redeemed against the vault's actual pooled assets at the expense of other depositors. These specific mechanics are drawn from secondary reporting rather than an official post-mortem from ACryptoS or a published SlowMist report, and should be treated as the outlets' interpretation of the exploit pending primary confirmation.","heading":"November 2026 Vault Exploit","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"How small deposits drained 77 ACryptoS vaults and what users can still withdraw - crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/how-small-deposits-drained-77-acryptos-vaults-and-what-users-can-still-withdraw/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"ACryptoS Vault Exploit: How Tiny Deposits Drained 77 Pools - capwolf.com","type":"news_article","url":"https://capwolf.com/acryptos-vault-exploit-how-tiny-deposits-drained-77-pools/"}]},{"content":"Following the exploit, ACryptoS disabled the deposit function across affected vaults while leaving the withdrawal function open. Reporting notes that withdrawals, while technically available, only pay out against whatever assets remain in each vault, meaning affected users may not recover their full pre-exploit balances. The team reportedly stated that it no longer has the resources to continue maintaining the protocol and urged users to withdraw their funds as soon as possible, which several outlets characterize as a de facto shutdown or deprecation of the protocol. One source referenced a 10% bounty offered for return of exploited funds, though no distribution plan, timetable, or reimbursement commitment has been published. No official statement from ACryptoS's own channels (website, X/Twitter, or Discord) could be independently located during this investigation; the response described here is as relayed by crypto-news outlets and incident trackers such as ChainCatcher, and should be considered secondary-sourced pending direct confirmation.","heading":"Team Response and Operational Wind-Down","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"How small deposits drained 77 ACryptoS vaults and what users can still withdraw - crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/how-small-deposits-drained-77-acryptos-vaults-and-what-users-can-still-withdraw/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainCatcher coverage of ACryptoS exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2302840"}]},{"content":"As of this writing, no official SlowMist report, formal post-mortem, or primary statement from ACryptoS has been independently located to corroborate the loss figure, root-cause mechanics, or stated wind-down. All information currently available derives from secondary crypto-news coverage (crypto.news, ChainCatcher, capwolf.com) summarizing incident-tracker and SlowMist-attributed figures. This absence of primary-source disclosure (an audited post-mortem, on-chain forensic report, or official team communication) limits confidence in the precise technical details of the exploit and the scope of the protocol's planned discontinuation.","heading":"Lack of Primary Disclosure","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"How small deposits drained 77 ACryptoS vaults and what users can still withdraw - crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/how-small-deposits-drained-77-acryptos-vaults-and-what-users-can-still-withdraw/"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"How small deposits drained 77 ACryptoS vaults and what users can still withdraw - crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/how-small-deposits-drained-77-acryptos-vaults-and-what-users-can-still-withdraw/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"ACryptoS Vault Exploit: How Tiny Deposits Drained 77 Pools - capwolf.com","type":"news_article","url":"https://capwolf.com/acryptos-vault-exploit-how-tiny-deposits-drained-77-pools/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainCatcher coverage of ACryptoS exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2302840"}],"summary":"ACryptoS is a DeFi yield-vault protocol that was exploited on November 8, 2026, with approximately $665,000 drained from 77 vaults across Arbitrum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Base and Optimism, according to security firm SlowMist. Reporting attributes the loss to a missing input-validation check in a multi-token deposit function that allowed attackers to mint a majority of vault shares with minimal deposits. The team disabled deposits, left withdrawals open against remaining vault assets, and stated it no longer has the resources to continue maintaining the protocol, effectively signaling a wind-down.","timeline":[{"date":"2026-11","date_evidence":"Security firm SlowMist recorded approximately $665,000 in losses from an 8 November ACryptoS exploit affecting 77 vaults across Arbitrum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Base and Optimism.","date_original":"2026-11-08","event":"Exploit drains an estimated $665,000 from 77 ACryptoS vaults across five chains via a missing input-validation flaw in a multi-token deposit function.","source":"crypto.news","source_url":"https://crypto.news/how-small-deposits-drained-77-acryptos-vaults-and-what-users-can-still-withdraw/"},{"date":"2026-11","date_original":"2026-11-09","event":"ACryptoS exploit is publicly reported; the team disables deposits, keeps withdrawals open against remaining vault assets, and signals it can no longer resource protocol maintenance.","source":"crypto.news / ChainCatcher","source_url":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2302840"}]},"v":1}