Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521509
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T15:36:28.757Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 46LnPHFoKCXGKMDuyEXr8qahbUL47S7NKqtKPkCTjsPA
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1557 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T15:36:28.292Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"e3ad1666-117b-460f-add3-88e6cde00c95","new_score":18,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-second-flash-loan-exploit-via-same-unpatched-vector","prev_score":18,"reason":"The large majority of discrete factual claims on this page — dates, dollar figures, the flash-loan mechanism, TVL impact, fund movement, and the 2023 incident's facts — are well corroborated across independent outlets and, where checked directly, against Allbridge's own postmortem text and a contemporaneous security firm's (QuillAudits) analysis. However, the page's single load-bearing claim — that the July 2026 exploit occurred through the 'same unpatched vector' as 2023 because Allbridge's single-pool-per-blockchain commitment was left unfulfilled on Solana — rests on a mischaracterization of its own cited sources: both TechTimes and CryptoTimes present this as an open, unconfirmed question with competing explanations, not a settled finding, and no source (including Allbridge itself) has confirmed why or whether the 2023 fix applied to Solana. The page also omits/understates two significant, publicly reported developments that postdate its sources: Allbridge's subsequent commitment to remove liquidity pools entirely in favor of CCTP/LayerZero routing, and a third Allbridge exploit on August 19, 2026 that hit that very remediation path.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}