Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · KelpDAO vs. LayerZero — Civil Lawsuit (September 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 26 (-2)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462171393
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T18:25:54.548Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T18:26:01.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T18:26:01.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4BJGiX6GALKb36zNVaAmvrFogZvQG1zUdR1MDKQURfrG
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1825 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"93d4dc994d5387ccbdb9ccde25fe1f23","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T18:25:54.290Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3333,"investigation_id":"b271260c-2ae5-43d8-964e-49fc6569d948","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"kelpdao-vs-layerzero-civil-lawsuit-september-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"Three of nine checked claims (claim_findings[5], [6], [8]) could not be supported by any source: the March 2026 developer social-engineering detail, the June 1 Aave restoration with $177M bad debt, and the unattributed 'first major civil litigation in Canada' claim. That is 33% unverified, in the significant band. The page also describes the New York frozen-funds proceedings out of date (claim_findings[7], omission_findings[1]) and omits a third defendant and a single-source case number (claim_findings[0], [1]). The core lawsuit facts and the exploit timeline were confirmed, so the penalty sits at the lower end of the band and the page is not delisted.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-2,"score_limit":{"applied":-2,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission (omission_findings[1]): a later New York order allowing an Arbitrum DAO vote to move the frozen ETH to Aave, which the page does not mention. This is consistent with, and reinforces, the significant band already implied by the percentage."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}