Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Aperture LM
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 57 → 57 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 463287074
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-30T12:34:43.599Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-30T12:35:09.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-30T12:35:09.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Gpwvqe55XwXtoySrghU4SSqRjgmdKCbksTgTERC8fe5C
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1606 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"f6b898824275a9670234d62e4a72b022","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-30T12:34:43.345Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2727,"investigation_id":"012e009b-3cec-4ec2-9443-5a1873c079ce","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":57,"page_slug":"aperture-lm","prev_score":57,"reason":"The core exploit facts hold: the date, the losses, the affected chains, the vulnerable function, the contract addresses and the audit list were all confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1], [6]). Three claims could not be verified (claim_findings[8], [9], [10]), putting the unverified share at exactly 30%, and three more are only partly supported: the PeckShield first-flag attribution, the 'primary attacker' label for an address AMLBot calls a copycat wallet, and the Tornado Cash figure (claim_findings[2], [3], [4]). The page is placed at the upper end of the minor band instead of the significant band because none of the unverified items is a core allegation, no claim was disputed, the one omission is minor, and the reviewer's confidence is low (0.55). The high-priority gap on current status (whether any post-mortem, compensation or relaunch has happened) and the ZachXBT section, which asserts a flag the page admits it cannot source, should be corrected.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}