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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-13)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443517968
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T22:40:31.247Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
95QftYjd9mfUGAuB7y8Jc3k2wRygnpQdQ1qnmdA4nTnK
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2396 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:40:31.087Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"c1e79c32-018b-450b-855c-d8d387fea579","new_score":0,"page_slug":"dprk-crypto-theft-h1-2026-trm-labs-blockaid-report","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 36 checked claims, 25 were confirmed, 6 partially supported, 4 disputed, and 1 unverifiable, putting the disputed-or-unverifiable share at about 13.9% -- within the range where a page is revised but not delisted. The issues that were found are concentrated in exactly the area this page depends on most: precise attribution to named research reports. The page's headline $643M/two-thirds figure is cited to a TRM Labs article that actually reports a different, earlier figure ($577M/76%, for a shorter year-to-date window), while the real source of the $643M number is a separate TRM Labs report the page never cites (claim_findings[0], claim_findings[3]). The page also overstates TRM Labs' and Elliptic's role in attributing the Drift Protocol attack to a named threat-actor subgroup with 'medium confidence' -- that specific, graded attribution reportedly came from Drift itself, SEAL 911, and Mandiant, with TRM Labs and Elliptic only corroborating a general North Korea link (claim_findings[8]). A $75 million figure for funds frozen by Arbitrum after the KelpDAO hack appears three separate times on the page, while independent outlets consistently report $71 million (claim_findings[17], claim_findings[23], claim_findings[34]). Finally, the page's summary presents 55% and 76% as if they were two contemporaneous, alternate methodology-based estimates for the same H1 2026 period, when the 76% figure is an earlier, narrower snapshot that the same firm's own later report superseded -- a more misleading framing than simply citing a stale number, since it implies an unresolved disagreement between sources where none exists. None of this undermines the page's core narrative -- the Drift, KelpDAO, and Humanity Protocol incidents, the OFAC sanctions action, and the general scale of DPRK crypto theft are all well supported -- but the sourcing precision failures are numerous enough and concentrated enough in load-bearing claims to warrant a moderate penalty and revision rather than approval.","score_delta":-13,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}