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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
22 → 12 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464279537
Off-chain at
2026-11-01T23:37:50.398Z
Anchored at
2026-11-01T23:38:00.000Z
Block time
2026-11-01T23:38:00.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DQUkEkDvtt1TyLfrKHNrZ5XDdb58GDYVfyEP5XEqguDh
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1453 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"9449a316aecea0bbc0412ec2ec527c1b","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T23:37:50.161Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2308,"investigation_id":"b2d97eef-f3b5-4dcb-8128-ea66069d00b6","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":12,"page_slug":"trezor-email-provider-breach-brevo-september-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The core facts of the incident (138 Brevo accounts, 6 phishing and 43 exported, 347,149 contacts, about 2,500 clicks, 20-minute takedown, no reported losses) were confirmed against Brevo and Trezor primary sources. Three of 12 claims (25%) could not be verified: the hardcoded Cloudflare key (claim_findings[7]), the CVE-2026-72898 identifier (claim_findings[10]) and the 2022 Mailchimp entry (claim_findings[11]). The page also states that Brevo completed its permanent fix on Sept 10 when the write-up says it was being deployed (claim_findings[2] and [3]), and it omits that Trezor cites 120 affected accounts against Brevo's 138. The subject is still operating and the page does not contradict that, so a minor correction is warranted rather than a larger penalty.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}