Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 51 → 51 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 459464472
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-21T02:35:21.694Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-21T02:35:50.828Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- As3TZautXrqUkLsDLK9gLQPy6SBgGFcKkPSV4Modnt2U
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1914 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"fdd1b0500368a2f65b17e0e4ea102483","decided_at":"2026-10-21T02:35:21.516Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0588,"findings_hash":"8xWTxKCofsmuCp2stGSeEXzz3bhe899PRxrtUsEAKPZw","investigation_id":"81428e11-1d41-4a04-9369-d9826a55dfe9","mode":"findings_only","new_score":51,"page_content_hash":"092ed24acbf598a03ac8e2347aae8e2785eb7af46b7fc85d1e03803a7e515d9b","page_slug":"btcpay-server-lnd-macaroon-credential-exploit-august-2026","prev_score":51,"reason":"The page's core factual claims — the nature and date of the vulnerability, the affected version range, the named victims (Foundation/Zach Herbert and Citadel21/hodlonaut), the 2.4.2 patch contents, and the recovery bounty terms — are well supported by the cited tier-1 and tier-2 sources and corroborated independently. The most significant problem is that the Patch and Remediation section still instructs operators to move funds out of BTCPay-generated on-chain hot wallets, advice the official advisory has since withdrawn (as of an October 14, 2026 revision) after clarifying that BTCPay's own on-chain wallets are not at risk; this is now stale and should be corrected, and the timeline should record the revision. A secondary, lower-credibility citation (startupfortune.com) does not actually substantiate the 'bug present for an undisclosed period' framing it is used to support, though the claim itself is hedged enough not to be false. One accepted community submission duplicates an already-cited official source and its 'incriminating' label is questionable given the article's largely mitigating content. The page would benefit from addressing the on-chain fund-tracing angle and the cross-outlet disagreement about the exact technical exploitation mechanism.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}