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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Bonk
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
45 → 33 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443525326
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T10:40:23.320Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
D2JqMyEsYEtkQhuzXyn6yoSMh6qUMj4mBQCgfF6WBR3X
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1746 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T10:40:22.787Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"2a48b3c5-5a6f-4913-a093-0800cc23a7e9","new_score":33,"page_slug":"bonk","prev_score":45,"reason":"The numeric disputed rate (1 disputed + 0 unverifiable out of 11 claims = 9.1%) falls in the approve band on its own, but two of this run's explicit adjustment rules override a flat approval here. First, claim_findings[7] disputes the page's own summary statement that there are 'no protocol-level exploits recorded' -- the reviewer found a well-documented ~$20M BonkDAO governance-attack treasury drain (~July 2026) and a subsequent Upbit delisting citing unresolved security issues, neither mentioned on the page. This is not a peripheral fact; it directly contradicts the core safety assurance a risk-intelligence page exists to provide, on a widely-held token, so it carries more weight than an ordinary single disputed item. Second, coverage_gaps lists a high-priority gap for exactly this same missing security-incident history, and this run's rules direct that a high-priority gap should push a page toward review_revise even when the disputed percentage is low. Compounding this, claim_findings[5] shows the page presents a 1-trillion-token burn as a hypothetical future condition when the threshold was actually reached and the burn scheduled/executed roughly eight months before this review (marked stale, wrong-direction). Given these findings, together with the reviewer's moderate (0.75) confidence, a light downward revision is warranted rather than either a clean approval or a denial.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}