Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Clober Liquidity Vault
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 52 → 52 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443512464
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T07:43:04.536Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 37Wm4RucXB15jgraDWpYcuxYHbKnCBj8XQZqmwMZqLWD
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1746 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:43:04.209Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"1a79704b-57a7-48c8-a46e-fc27bd4c6d12","new_score":52,"page_slug":"clober-liquidity-vault","prev_score":52,"reason":"The reviewer found zero disputed claims out of 47, with a disputed_pct of 8.5%, well within the approve threshold. The page's core narrative — the December 10, 2024 reentrancy exploit, the ~133.7 ETH loss, the technical mechanism, the declined bounty, and the unrecovered funds — is independently corroborated across CertiK, Rekt News, SolidityScan, PeckShield, BaseScan, and live DefiLlama on-chain TVL data (claim_findings[1], [43]). The issues raised are citation-attribution problems rather than factual errors: claim_findings[24] shows a real conclusion (that the vulnerability was a post-audit code addition) misattributed to CertiK and QuillAudits when it actually traces to Trust Security and Web3 Is Going Great, and claim_findings[29], [43], [44] show true facts (non-prosecution commitment, bounty decline) cited to articles that don't contain them even though the facts are corroborated elsewhere on the page. The one stale finding, claim_findings[38], understates the protocol's current TVL rather than overstating risk, so it does not weigh toward a penalty. The single high-priority coverage gap (on-chain forensic tracing of the stolen funds in the ~20 months since the exploit) is a suggestion for further investigation, not a documented discrepancy the reviewer actually found, so per standing practice it does not override an otherwise clean disputed-claim record.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}