Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457492395
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T03:46:56.099Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T03:46:59.718Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2ZYgPs8K7NvSrD1JekbJqVXJGJdKVdxz5EaAUsMPVcGa
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1885 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"6d323a3a747f4bd992dc8e6866d96b76","decided_at":"2026-10-16T03:46:55.920Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"6Pm5chBvxbA9g4CNX4Q5Q8DvGtF1maCi4uCpvd6SMmnE","investigation_id":"d9de73f6-b05b-4329-858b-caf586a1203b","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"8e7cf0ce4995536af4f1695306159b19429ccbca13926eda8d43d67c5ada1fa7","page_slug":"vanta-stealer-python-infostealer-targeting-crypto-wallets","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page is substantially well-sourced and accurate. Direct verification of the primary source (Point Wild's Lat61 report) confirms the technical architecture claims (PyInstaller/Python 3.10/Visual Studio 2022/PyArmor/__pyarmor__ bootstrap/dynamic module retrieval/Discord API profiling), the publication date and named researchers, and the PCRisk and Rankiteo citations check out on direct fetch (dates, AV detection names, severity score, and targeting details all match). One clear factual error was found and is repeated twice: the page states Point Wild published '20 SHA256 sample hashes' / '20 SHA256 IOCs,' but the source report lists only 19 — the two specific hashes quoted on the page are accurate, only the count is wrong (defect_group vanta-hash-count). Three secondary citations (GBHackers, Cyberpress, CyberSecurityNews) could not be independently fetched or archive-verified in this session due to bot-blocking and an unreachable archive.org, so their date/content claims are marked unverifiable rather than confirmed or disputed — this is a tooling limitation, not evidence against them. No accepted community submissions existed to review. No instruction-like text aimed at the reviewer was found anywhere in the page content.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}