Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 3 (+3)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464430988
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T08:38:12.608Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T08:38:36.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T08:38:36.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 32BwiBdp2Zmg1sqJqeuUqJmb9RwFyHjZbL8VLXArhv1E
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1473 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"7709a096d820cb3c5253c4de95b0a589","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T08:38:12.313Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"398c8634-edab-4f6a-8f3d-ca0abc756f59","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":3,"page_slug":"darksword-ios-safari-zero-click-exploit-chain-targeting-crypto-wallets","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 11 claims checked, 9 were confirmed and 2 were partially supported; none were disputed or unverifiable, so the disputed share is 0%. The core technical, attribution and patch claims match Google's primary threat-intelligence post (claim_findings[0-3], [8]), and the October 2026 Macworld and BlockTempo claims match those articles (claim_findings[4-5]). One citation issue remains: the TechCrunch quote about the GitHub leak and Apple's quarter-of-devices estimate seems to come from a March 23 article rather than the cited April 1 one (claim_findings[6]), and should be corrected. The one omission found (the reported commercial sale of the kit) is minor, and the subject is still active as the page says.","replaces_fact_checks":{"score_before_fact_checks":3,"undone":1},"reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":3,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}