Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Dexible V2
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 42 → 42 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465092305
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-03T23:59:37.219Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-03T23:59:55.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-03T23:59:55.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2XEpKqMobwHEstSqTsGdjCcLJFHtP1eSdSw9aj87hdsz
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1514 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"8eb86f2bf72290b8e2cc5e9d27aa24f7","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-03T23:59:36.993Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"3eecc0d3-f580-4e80-90f1-a1e419716f25","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":42,"page_slug":"dexible-v2","prev_score":42,"reason":"Of 8 claims checked, 1 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer and is left out of the percentage. Of the remaining 7, 2 could not be verified (about 29%): the 'few whales' 85% statement (claim_findings[2]) is not in the cited REKT article, and the Ethereum contract address (claim_findings[3]) is malformed, with 43 hex characters instead of 40. The victim count of 17 (claim_findings[1]) differs from reporting of 18 wallets. The core exploit facts (date, amounts, attacker address, BlockTower loss, missing audit, laundering path) match REKT. The closure claim and its 2023-12-31 date (claim_findings[7]) rest on a Crunchbase listing the reviewer could not read, and that is a coverage limit rather than a defect. The penalty is kept moderate because the reviewer's confidence is 0.5 and only REKT was fully checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}