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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
59 → 59 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
461972224
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T06:39:35.798Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T06:39:57.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T06:39:57.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
3PNzXy8fhnS9gx57vBEizL5G9xULEBYS22Ub3fy8aSxC
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1424 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"b02fb6c5463ac9fd791b5e69b382f686","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:39:35.644Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4667,"findings_hash":"GiAHnTLaKhrjTuf63pqMHwj67ERYCcRmaAPzjuSvxuKU","investigation_id":"831828e5-711a-4123-a4ac-a35a12746d72","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":59,"page_content_hash":"c898ab2d9c6ff848684320b59c9bcafe42acd1ecebde00c048046117f70ca90c","page_slug":"spartan","prev_score":59,"reason":"The core incident (about $30M flash loan exploit of the liquidity share calculation on BSC, May 2021) is well supported. Problems: the stated 04:38 UTC attack time conflicts with CoinDesk's report that the team disclosed the exploit around 00:21 UTC; GitHub dates and the 'development stopped since 2024' claim do not match the org page, which shows contracts last updated September 2023 and DApp/API repos updated in 2026; the timeline CoinDesk citation does not say what the entry claims. Many team-statement and audit details could not be checked because Medium returned 403.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":15,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":true,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}