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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#2
Score
18 → 18 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462172151
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T18:28:16.196Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T18:28:41.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T18:28:41.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
EPrBM9FBm7kfiLPhAeRJwJCyqVw8f7VArKhrApzmvuYF
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1528 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"0617ac1c9a3b9e1c9780dd0e0ba2e00a","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T18:28:16.116Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4615,"findings_hash":"8PkRB1zUMF39nagJs6U2vi97z1cs3D1soYgK1h2GkqWs","investigation_id":"18c96289-1f9d-428f-a5c8-b1865010e775","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":18,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"5299c05cb8065a432f0fde3a73320482d344727b7d49db38fd7a23f9b11f1dbe","page_slug":"fetch-ai-nunet-cross-project-exploit-september-2026","prev_score":18,"reason":"The core facts hold: about 8.72M FET and 408.5M NTX were taken by one wallet, with the SingularityNET bridge exploit following, and the figures match multiple sources. Three things are wrong or overstated. The attack most likely occurred on September 19 UTC, not September 20. The ETH conversion was partial, not all proceeds. The page states the same-minute timing and same-key cause as settled, although an independent report puts the two events about 29 minutes apart and the sources describe two different compromised keys. The attacker address and several secondary outlets could not be checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":13,"sequence_num":2,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}