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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
10 → 0 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443523356
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T03:34:58.056Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BXJTG6n53yqSzWpJmnVLSuq2CqDapgnQ6NfTv51qBhH4
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1645 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:34:57.908Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6b0b5653-4ab1-4c49-8ab8-cc603345bb23","new_score":0,"page_slug":"defi-governance-attack-wave-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"All six individual attacks named on this page (BonkDAO, Term Finance, Token of Power, BarnBridge, Panther Protocol, Unicly) are independently confirmed by multiple outlets and are genuinely governance-mechanism exploits, not misclassified incidents. The problem is with the page's central thesis, not its facts: the 'connected wave' framing rests almost entirely on one vendor blog post, and independent reporting instead describes governance attacks as a rare, minority risk category rather than a coordinated campaign (claim_findings[0]). The page also folds Term Finance -- which happened 17 days after the vendor's own tracked window closed -- into that vendor's incident count without flagging the mismatch (claim_findings[6], the review's one fully disputed item), and presents a $22M-$30M loss range as if it were one measurement when it actually blends two different scopes of incidents (claim_findings[3]). Combined with a high-priority gap -- no on-chain addresses or transaction hashes anywhere on a platform built around on-chain-anchored evidence -- these overstate how settled the 'wave' framing is, even though the underlying incidents themselves are solid. This calls for revision of the framing and added on-chain sourcing rather than removal of the page.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}