Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · DeFi Governance Attack Wave 2026
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 10 → 0 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443523356
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T03:34:58.056Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BXJTG6n53yqSzWpJmnVLSuq2CqDapgnQ6NfTv51qBhH4
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1645 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:34:57.908Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6b0b5653-4ab1-4c49-8ab8-cc603345bb23","new_score":0,"page_slug":"defi-governance-attack-wave-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"All six individual attacks named on this page (BonkDAO, Term Finance, Token of Power, BarnBridge, Panther Protocol, Unicly) are independently confirmed by multiple outlets and are genuinely governance-mechanism exploits, not misclassified incidents. The problem is with the page's central thesis, not its facts: the 'connected wave' framing rests almost entirely on one vendor blog post, and independent reporting instead describes governance attacks as a rare, minority risk category rather than a coordinated campaign (claim_findings[0]). The page also folds Term Finance -- which happened 17 days after the vendor's own tracked window closed -- into that vendor's incident count without flagging the mismatch (claim_findings[6], the review's one fully disputed item), and presents a $22M-$30M loss range as if it were one measurement when it actually blends two different scopes of incidents (claim_findings[3]). Combined with a high-priority gap -- no on-chain addresses or transaction hashes anywhere on a platform built around on-chain-anchored evidence -- these overstate how settled the 'wave' framing is, even though the underlying incidents themselves are solid. This calls for revision of the framing and added on-chain sourcing rather than removal of the page.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}