Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Radix
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 54 → 54 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462278970
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T00:47:47.544Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T00:48:00.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T00:48:00.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5GP8yLWqeguYdwpmrzs2KuhUH6CKgxGtnJEg9vysadt8
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1748 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"5a71b9ac71eb9455abbcdba563c33750","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:47:47.271Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2143,"investigation_id":"dee50fd0-098b-4e22-8034-37f39cea49cb","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":54,"page_slug":"radix","prev_score":54,"reason":"By count, 3 of 14 checkable claims (about 21%) could not be verified (claim_findings[7], [11], [14]), which is the minor band. The page was moved to the significant band because it omits reported pool-price manipulation that extracted millions of XRD (omission_findings[0], material), which makes the stated loss look smaller than reported. Zellic, Hacken and SEAL 911 are named as patch verifiers in three places (claim_findings[2], [3], [4]) when the official report names only the investigators, and the XRD price is stale (claim_findings[10]). The core incident narrative (26 transactions, asset amounts, June 2023 origin, Sept 11 resumption) is well supported.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":14,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"omission_findings[0] is material: the page frames the loss as about $1.3M in bridged assets but omits reported liquidity-pool price distortion that let another account extract millions of XRD. This matches the high-priority coverage gap on downstream losses. The percentage band alone (minor) understates the problem."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}