Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Fortress Loans
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 50 → 50 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 463284309
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-30T12:24:58.683Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-30T12:25:21.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-30T12:25:21.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4TJqAQ6QGjUi3f5cxVj8FTxqhWKBLLPwW42jLtJ8FiMj
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1537 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"02873c6c2764c2090158b807c59e105f","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-30T12:24:58.443Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"c5ebecba-a25f-435c-afcf-b26ea3e8969d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_slug":"fortress-loans","prev_score":50,"reason":"The core account of the incident (governance takeover, Umbrella oracle flaw, about $3M drained, Tornado Cash laundering) was confirmed by CertiK and The Record (claim_findings[2]). Of the 6 claims that could be checked, 1 could not be verified (claim_findings[1], audit-scope inference), giving about 17%. Two further claims need correction: the page overstates CertiK's view that both weaknesses were identifiable in an audit (claim_findings[0]), and the DefiLlama TVL year appears to be 2025, not 2024 (claim_findings[6] and [7], based on a search snippet). Two claims (Umbrella compensation figures, attacker addresses) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer, so they are a coverage limit and not a defect of the page. The penalty is kept at the mild end because the issues are minor and the reviewer's confidence was moderate.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}