Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443518748
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T00:02:00.520Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EJzTdiY2RFp59dfhW3xG25zCaF8yiZGEiEZu4RMsnZJr
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1367 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T00:02:00.388Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"5fa545d1-320b-4b85-9850-7ff1ca773a30","new_score":0,"page_slug":"jadepuffer-first-fully-autonomous-ai-ransomware-targeting-crypto-wallet-keys","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's central superlative claim ('first fully autonomous AI ransomware') is consistently and correctly hedged as a vendor (Sysdig) assessment rather than an established fact, and the page proactively surfaces the same major caveats (unconfirmed exfiltration, hallucination-vs-real BTC wallet, unresolved credential origin) that this independent review also identified. Granular technical details (payload counts, timestamps, binary hashes, CVE mechanics) were spot-checked against the primary Sysdig research and against independent CVE/vendor sources and matched closely. The main issues found are a temporal conflation of two Langflow exposure-count statistics from different dates presented as concurrent, a likely off-by-one-day publication date for the second Sysdig report, an unsourced and likely superseded 'current Langflow version' claim, and omission of a second actively-exploited Langflow CVE that is already in the page's own source list.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}