Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · B-Squared Network
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 20 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521324
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T14:20:23.225Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7GbVEBLQWYquVdkrQjufe6g4C7d8T1frRwBvvTgETMyw
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1750 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T14:20:22.934Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a02f0fb3-a871-4ab8-8d3e-2e011d35e203","new_score":20,"page_slug":"b-squared-network","prev_score":28,"reason":"Per-claim accuracy on this page is strong: of 35 claims checked, 27 were confirmed outright and only 1 was disputed and 1 unverifiable, giving a disputed_pct of 5.7% (claim_findings[27], claim_findings[31]) — well inside the approve band on accuracy alone, and the page's central factual narrative (the $3.86M July 22, 2026 staking exploit) is independently corroborated, including against a separate incident tally verified elsewhere on the platform (claim_findings[2]). What moves this to revise is a structural problem the review surfaced outside the per-claim scoring: this page and a separately maintained page ('b2-network') describe the identical entity and identical incident without cross-referencing each other (coverage_gaps[0]), which risks the two being read as distinct risk profiles for one project. That is a high-priority omission about the page's own identity, not a request to expand coverage, and it warrants pushing the verdict out of the approve band even though the disputed rate is low. Two smaller, genuine defects reinforce a revise rather than approve: the page attributes detection of three hacks to 'Lookonchain and BlockBeats' in a way its own cited source contradicts, crediting PeckShieldAlert instead for two of the three (claim_findings[27]), and an investor-count figure ('at least 17 investors') that no cited source actually supports (claim_findings[10]).","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}